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Abstract—As the first decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) cryp-
tocurrency system allowing people to trade with pseudonymous
addresses, Bitcoin has become increasingly popular in recent
years. However, the P2P and pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin
make transactions on this platform very difficult to track, thus
triggering the emergence of various illegal activities in the Bitcoin
ecosystem. Particularly, mixing services in Bitcoin, originally
designed to enhance transaction anonymity, have been widely
employed for money laundry to complicate trailing illicit fund. In
this paper, we focus on the detection of the addresses belonging
to mixing services, which is an important task for anti-money
laundering in Bitcoin. Specifically, we provide a feature-based
network analysis framework to identify statistical properties of
mixing services from three levels, namely, network level, account
level and transaction level. To better characterize the transaction
patterns of different types of addresses, we propose the concept
of Attributed Temporal Heterogeneous motifs (ATH motifs).
Moreover, to deal with the issue of imperfect labeling, we tackle
the mixing detection task as a Positive and Unlabeled learning
(PU learning) problem and build a detection model by leveraging
the considered features. Experiments on real Bitcoin datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness of our detection model and the
importance of hybrid motifs including ATH motifs in mixing
detection.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, mixing services, network motifs, net-
work mining, anti-money laundering.
I. INTRODUCTION
B ITCOIN, the world’s first peer-to-peer (P2P) cryptocur-rency system [1], has become one of the hottest buz-
zwords with a dominant share of the cryptocurrency market
[2] due to its pseudonymous nature in decentralized trading
process as well as its low transaction fees.
However, the P2P and pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin
make transactions on this platform very difficult to track,
thus triggering the emergence of various illegal activities in
the Bitcoin ecosystem [3]. For instance, about 7,000 Bitcoins
which worth $41 million have been stolen from Binance
recently [4], one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges
in the world. Then the stolen Bitcoins can be cashed out
directly through exchanges. This way may easily expose the
identity of the thieves via the identity information provided
by the exchanges. Thus the stolen Bitcoins usually need to
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Fig. 1. An example of mixing services, which can conceal the identity of users
and complicate fund tracing by participating in a transaction with multiple
users.
be laundered into “clean” Bitcoins by some techniques before
they are cashed out. It has been demonstrated that, mixing
services such as BitLaundry, Helix Light, Bitcoin Fog, etc.,
have involved in this process of money laundry [5] and can
be regarded as significant tools for concealing illicit profits in
Bitcoin.
Bitcoin mixing services are originally designed to enhance
the anonymity of transactions and make the sources of funds
more untraceable. Fig. 1 gives a simple illustration of Bitcoin
mixing. Three users represented as A1, A2 and A3 send 1
Bitcoin (abbreviation BTC) to three addresses M1, M2 and
M3 of a mixing service M , respectively, and provide their own
new addresses A4, A5, and A6 to receive the Bitcoin back.
Then M randomly select an address from M1, M2 and M3 to
return money to A4, A5, and A6. In this way, the relationships
between sources and destinations are confused, thus increasing
the difficulty of tracing the source of funds and analyzing the
transaction behavior of users. Meanwhile, due to the pseudony-
mous requirements of Bitcoin, it is unlikely to enforce Know-
Your-Customer (KYC) processes, which are guidelines in anti-
money laundering. Therefore, the study on identification of
mixing services and tracing illegal transactions in Bitcoin is
of great value for building a healthier Bitcoin ecosystem.
Fortunately, the public and irreversible transaction records
provide us an opportunity to detect irregular transaction pat-
terns in Bitcoin. To this end, in this paper, we focus on
detecting addresses belonging to mixing services via mining
the transaction records and attempt to characterize their trans-
action patterns. Based on the detection results, we can further
chase up users involved in criminal activities by analyzing
users who take part in Bitcoin mixing.
In recent years, several studies have shed light on the
problem of detecting Bitcoin mixing services. Fanusie et al.
[6] pointed out that mixing services and exchanges are two
key components in laundering Bitcoins while mixing services
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Fig. 2. An overview of the proposed Bitcoin mixing detection framework including four modules, namely, data collection, network construction, feature
extraction, model training and application.
have a higher propensity to be used in laundering illicit money.
To answer how mixing services work, the operation model
of five mixing services were studied by reverse-engineering
methods in [5]. Based on the observations given by [5], Prado-
Romero proposed the problem of mixing detection and tackled
this problem by exploiting the method of community outlier
detection [7]. Yet till now, Bitcoin mixing detection is still
an extremely tricky task due to several great challenges as
follows:
(1) Incomplete label information. Labeled addresses as-
sociated with mixing services occupy only a small fraction of
all addresses, and the true identities of most other addresses
are unknown in Bitcoin.
(2) Dynamic process with multiple transactions. Some
mixing services use hubs to combine multiple transactions or
split a large amount of money into multiple smaller trans-
actions, thus making it more difficult to identify the mixing
processes as well as the addresses involved in the processes.
(3) Various evasion techniques and transaction patterns.
Mixing services are provided by different third-party plat-
forms, and their evasion techniques and transaction patterns
vary a lot from each other.
In this work, to deal with the problem of incomplete label
information, we tackle the task of Bitcoin mixing detection
as a Positive and Unlabeled learning (PU learning) problem
[8] and then adopt a two-stage strategy to enhance the detect-
ing performance. In order to analyze the transaction records
more comprehensively, we construct two kinds of tempo-
ral directed transaction networks including a homogeneous
Address-Address Interaction Network (AAIN) and a hetero-
geneous Transaction-Address Interaction Network (TAIN), to
depict the relationship between addresses and the relationship
between addresses and transactions, respectively. Network mo-
tifs have been widely proven to be a powerful tool in handling
various network mining tasks [9]–[11]. To better analyze
the complicated dynamic processes in the Bitcoin transaction
network, we propose a novel concept called Attributed
Temporal Heterogeneous motifs (ATH motifs) for the TAIN.
The hybrid motifs, composed of temporal homogeneous motifs
in AAIN and ATH motifs in TAIN, are employed as vital
features for the detection of mixing services.
As shown in Fig. 2, the proposed mixing detection frame-
work mainly contains four modules: (1) Data collection,
which gathers the Bitcoin transaction data from a Bitcoin client
and craws the label information from WalletExplorer1. (2)
Network construction, constructing AAIN and TAIN from
the transaction records for feature extraction. (3) Feature
extraction, whose purpose is to extract features from multiple
levels. (4) Model training and application, which trains
the model using the training set, makes prediction for the
unlabeled addresses and finally outputs the detected mixing
addresses.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper can be
listed as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply
network motifs on the problem of Bitcoin mixing detection.
We propose the novel concept of ATH motifs and demonstrate
that both temporal and ATH motifs play an important role in
Bitcoin mixing detection.
(2) We propose a feature-based transaction network analysis
framework and generalize the issue of Bitcoin mixing detec-
tion as a PU learning problem, the purpose being to make
better use of the labeled addresses under the precondition of
imperfectly labeled datasets.
(3) The proposed model achieves a high true positive rate
and a low false positive rate in Bitcoin mixing detection, which
facilitates fund tracing and crime detection in the Bitcoin
ecosystem.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as
follows. Sections II to V introduce the details of the afore-
mentioned four modules of the proposed mixing detection
framework one by one. Then we present experimental results
in Section VI. Finally, we provide some related work in
Section VII and conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. DATA COLLECTION
The transaction data of Bitcoin are contained in blocks
orderly, and are publicly accessible by running a Bitcoin client.
WalletExplorer is a smart Bitcoin block explorer providing
name information of addresses by registering to some services,
making transactions with them and observing how the Bitcoin
flows merge, and the name database of WalletExplorer in
not updated since 2016. From the name dataset provided
by WalletExplorer, we crawl the labeled addresses belonging
to mixing services recorded between 2014 and 2016. As
Bitcoin transactions increase explosively during this period,
1https://www.walletexplorer.com.
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(a) Transaction data.
(b) AAIN. (c) TAIN.
Fig. 3. An example for our network construction where (a) is the raw
transaction data, (b) and (c) are the corresponding Address-Address Interac-
tion Network (AAIN) and Transaction-Address Interaction Network (TAIN)
respectively. Here t1 < t2 < t3, indicating that tx1 happens earlier than
tx2, and tx2 happens earlier than tx3.
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE DATASETS.
Dataset Start time Unlabeled address
Labeled address1
BitcoinFog BitLaunder HelixMixer
2014 00:00, Nov. 1 2,507,872 6088 8 0
2015 00:00, Jun. 1 2,525,038 3911 9 2
2016 00:00, Jan. 1 2,502,738 198 2 3856
1 Addresses of three mixing services including Bitcoin Fog, BitLaunder and
Helix Mixer crawled from WalletExplorer are as our labeled addresses.
we consider three snapshots of Bitcoin transaction data with
mixing labels between November 2014 and January 2016
with six months being the sampling interval. Each snapshot
contains 1,500,000 transaction records. The three snapshots
are referred to as the 2014, 2015 and 2016 datasets. Table I
shows the statistics of these three datasets. On the average,
the labeled addresses only account for about 0.19% of all
addresses appearing in the transaction data.
As mixing services serve as intermediaries to anonymize
the transactions, we filter addresses with either only input
transactions or output transactions which obviously not belong
to mixing services. By applying this simple rule, 131 labeled
addresses and 1,635,904 unlabeled addresses are filtered from
the three datasets, which occupy 0.9% and 22.2% of their
corresponding class, respectively.
III. NETWORK CONSTRUCTION AND MOTIF DEFINITION
Transaction records of Bitcoin can be abstracted as a huge
network, where each node refers to a Bitcoin address and
each edge represents a transaction process between addresses.
Network motifs, which can be regarded as small subgraph pat-
terns in networks, have been demonstrated as important tools
for characterizing higher-order interactions and understanding
various properties of complex systems [9], [10].
We first construct a homogeneous Address-Address In-
teraction Network (AAIN), which is a temporal directed
network, to investigate the interaction patterns of addresses.
21 3 δ=15s
(a) A 3-node, 3-edge, δ-temporal motif M .
7s5s 20s7s5s 8s
a ac c
b b
(b) Two motif instances of M .
6s2s 21s4s5s 6s
a ac c
b b
(c) Two graph patterns which are
not instances of M .
Fig. 4. An example of a motif (a) and its instances (b). Graph patterns in
(c) are not instances of M because of their out of order edge sequence or
their out of range edge occurring time (the constrained time window δ is set
as 15s).
Since Bitcoin transactions usually involve multiple inputs and
multiple outputs, from this figure depicting the transaction
relationships between address pairs, it is difficult to figure out
how much an address has taken from another address. To this
end, we construct a heterogeneous Transaction-Address Inter-
action Network (TAIN) to represent the transaction amount
information. This is an attributed temporal heterogeneous
information network (HIN) where a node can be either a
particular transaction or an address. From TAIN, we can
clearly find how much an address has sent to or received
from a transaction. Therefore, compared with AAIN, TAIN
can display the strength of money transfer more clearly. Fig. 3
gives an example for the construction of AAIN and TAIN. In
the following, we present the definition of AAIN, TAIN and
their motifs in detail.
A. AAIN and Temporal Motifs
Definition 1 (AAIN): An Address-Address Interaction Net-
work (AAIN) is a temporal network G = (V,E), where V is
the set of nodes and E is the set of edges carrying temporal
information. Each node v ∈ V denotes a Bitcoin address and
each edge e ∈ E standing for a transaction is defined as a tuple
(u, v, tx, t), denoting that address u is a source and address v
is a destination for a transaction tx happening at time t.
AAIN is a temporal direct multigraph which can reflect the
flowing directions of money. As shown in Fig. 3(b), Bitcoins
of a1 can be transferred to a4 via tx1, tx2 and tx3 while
Bitcoins in a3 cannot reach a2 because tx2 occurs ahead of
tx3.
Definition 2 (Temporal Motifs): Temporal motifs are defined
as interconnection patterns occurring in temporal networks
[10]. Particularly, a k-node, l-edge, δ-temporal motif instance
M lk(δ) of a temporal network G = (V,E) can be represented
as
M lk(δ) = (V
k
M , E
l
M , δ),
where V kM (V
k
M ⊆ V ) is a set of k nodes, ElM (ElM ⊆ E)
is a set of l edges and δ is a time window indicating that
all of edges in the motif occur within a δ duration, i.e., an
increased sequence t1, t2, ..., tl which records the timestamp
of each edge in the motif instance satisfies t1 6 t2 6 ... 6 tl
and tl − t1 6 δ.
Different from static network motifs, temporal motifs well
preserve the time-ordered sequence of contacts in a time
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(a)
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 5. (b)-(e) are four instances of the ATH motif (a) in transaction network.
The edge vector ΓV , which maps the amount value attribute to the first bit and
the time information to the second bit, can differentiate varieties of transaction
patterns with the same topology. In this case, the first bit of ΓV is set as 0 if
the amount of tx1 is higher than tx2, and as 1 otherwise; the second bit of
ΓV is set as 0 if the time of tx1 is later than tx2, and as 1 otherwise.
window, being effective in analyzing temporal structure of
complex networks. Figs. 4(a)-(b) illustrate a 3-node, 3-edge,
δ-temporal motif M and its instances, while graph patterns in
Fig. 4(c) are not instances of M because their edge order or
occurring time window does not satisfy the condition.
B. TAIN and ATH Motifs
An attributed temporal heterogeneous information network
(HIN) is defined as a directed graph G = (V,E,Ω) with
ϕV : V → ΓV for node types mapping, ϕE : E → ΓE
for edge types mapping satisfying |ΓV | > 1 or |ΓE | > 1,
and Ω denoting the set of attributes attached to edges in
the graph. Based on the attributed temporal HIN, we present
the definition of TAIN and attributed temporal heterogeneous
motifs (ATH motifs).
Definition 3 (TAIN): A TAIN is an attributed temporal
heterogeneous information network G = (V,E,Ω), where
ΓV = {address,transaction} denotes the set of node types,
ΓE = {transaction-address, address-transaction} denotes the
set of edge types, and Ω denotes the set of edge attributes
including transaction amount and transaction time.
A transaction-address edge (u, txin, a, t1) denotes that an
input transaction txin happens at time t1 and transfers a
Bitcoins into an address u, while an address-transaction
edge (v, txout, b, t2) denotes that an output transaction txout
happens at time t2 and transfers b Bitcoins out of an address
v. An example of TAIN is illustrated in Fig. 3(c), where
the square nodes represent transactions and the circle nodes
represent addresses.
Definition 4 (Attributed Temporal Heterogeneous (ATH)
Motifs): ATH motifs are local subgraphs of attributed temporal
HINs, described by a set of nodes, a set of edges, attributes
and a time window. A δ-ATH motif instance of an attributed
temporal HIN G = (V,E,Ω) can be defined as:
MATH(δ) = (VATH , EATH , ΓΩ , δ),
where VATH (VATH ⊆ V ) represents the set of nodes, EATH
(EATH ⊆ E) represents the set of edges, also satisfying node
(a) 2-edge δ-temporal motifs. (b) Attributed δ-ATH motifs.
Fig. 6. Hybrid motifs in Bitcoin, including temporal motifs in AAIN (a) and
ATH motifs in TAIN (b). The weight of edges in temporal motifs represents
the chronological order and each ATH motif accompanies with a mapped
vector.
types |{ϕV (v)|v ∈ VATH}| > 1 or edge types |{ϕE(e)|e ∈
EATH}| > 1. ΓΩ denotes a mapped vector of edge attributes,
and δ is a time window that constrains min(ψE(e)) + δ ≤
max(ψE(e)) for e ∈ EATH , where ψE is a time mapping
which maps each edge e ∈ E to its occurring time.
Fig. 5 shows us an example of ATH motif and its four
instances in a transaction network. Though the topology of
these motif instances are the same, the attribute information
separates these instances into four different transaction pat-
terns. For example, the instance in Fig. 5(c) represents the
transaction pattern of receiving money first and sending out
less money later, while the instance in Fig. 5(d) stands for
sending money out firstly and receiving less money later,
which has an opposite transaction order and leads to a negative
balance.
IV. FEATURE-BASED ANALYSIS
Due to the specific function of mixing Bitcoins, addresses
associated with mixing services may have several unique
features different from normal addresses. In the following, we
aim to extract features of the addresses from three levels and
conduct descriptive statistics on them.
A. Network Features
Different types of objects have different interaction ways in
complex systems, which would affect the topological structure
of the whole network. In this part, we extract network features
from both AAIN and TAIN. To characterize the interaction
patterns and reveal the functional properties in the network,
we propose to take some higher-order network features (i.e.
network motifs) into account.
For AAIN, we consider six simplest transaction patterns
with two edges and represent them as six kinds of 2-edge δ-
temporal motifs shown in Fig. 6(a). These six kinds of motifs
illustrate how an address interacts with other addresses within
a δ duration. For example, the α motif represents that an
address first receives money from a neighbor and then transfers
money to another neighbor while the α′ motif represents an
opposite transaction order.
For TAIN, we abstract the transactions of an address oc-
curring within a δ time window as three kinds of topological
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structures: all in, all out, in and out, which illustrate only input
transactions, only output transactions, both input and output
transactions occurring within the time window, respectively.
By taking the amount attribute and temporal information into
account, the direction and strength of Bitcoin transfer can
be better reflected in these substructures. In our scenario,
the relative size between the attribute information of input
and output transactions is more important than their actual
absolute value. Therefore, the in and out structure can be
further divided into four patterns, and all these six transaction
patterns can be represented as ATH motifs in TAIN. As shown
in Fig. 6(b), each kind of ATH motif has a binary value
function defining each bit of ΓΩ as follows.
ΓΩ [0] =
{
0 v¯in ≥ v¯out
1 v¯in < v¯out
, ΓΩ [1] =
{
0 t¯in > t¯out
1 t¯in ≤ t¯out
, (1)
where ΓΩ [0] and ΓΩ [1] denote the first and the second
bit of the mapped vector, respectively, v¯in and v¯out denote
the average amount value of input transactions and output
transactions, respectively, t¯in and t¯out denote the average time
of input transactions and output transactions, respectively.
Particularly, for the all in patterns which has no value
of v¯out and t¯out, the corresponding ΓΩ is defined as [0, 0].
Contrarily, ΓΩ of all out patterns are given as [1, 1].
We calculate the proportion of each kind of motifs described
above. Besides, we extract some basic network features from
AAIN such as in-degree, out-degree and so on. All the network
features are described as follows:
NF1-N6: The proportion of each kind of 2-edge δ-temporal
motifs given in Fig. 6(a).
NF7-N12: The proportion of each kind of ATH motifs given
in Fig. 6(b).
NF13: Value of in-degree.
NF14: Value of out-degree.
NF15: Average number of co-input brothers.
NF16: Average number of co-output brothers.
NF17: Number of unique successors.
NF18: Number of unique predecessors.
Tables II and III describe the average fraction of each
kind of temporal motifs and ATH motifs with δ = 3 hours,
respectively. The interpretation of this selected time window
will be provided in Section IV-C. Based on the statistics, we
summarize several findings as follows:
• Finding 1. The average fraction of α pattern is much
higher than the fraction of α′ pattern, and the fraction
of β2 pattern far outstrips the other kinds of in and out
motifs. Besides, this kind of difference is more significant
for labeled addresses. In other words, mixing services
are more in line with the transaction pattern of receiving
money firstly and sending money out latter with a balance
not less than 0.
• Finding 2. Based on the results of γ and γ′ patterns, we
can conclude that non-mixing service entity may reuse
some addresses in a short time while this situation seldom
happens for mixing services.
• Finding 3. By comparing the fraction of β with that of
β′ and the fraction of α1 with that of α2, we can see that
TABLE II
AVERAGE FRACTION OF δ-TEMPORAL MOTIFS (δ = 3 HOURS).
Temporal motifs α α′ β β′ γ γ′
Labeled address 0.2552 0.0051 0.5902 0.1465 0.0000 0.0030
Unlabeled address 0.2320 0.0576 0.4016 0.2395 0.0003 0.0690
TABLE III
AVERAGE FRACTION OF δ-ATH MOTIFS (δ = 3 HOURS).
ATH motifs α1 α2 β1 β2 β3 β4
Labeled address 0.0390 0.4912 0.0037 0.4498 0.0046 0.0117
Unlabeled address 0.1670 0.4932 0.0022 0.3122 0.0051 0.0203
mixing services prefer dispersing the “dirty” Bitcoins to
others, which is a usually adopted strategy for Bitcoin
mixing.
B. Account Features
The state and activeness of an address, in many cases, may
reflect which category the address belongs to, and thus we
introduce account features to describe the state and activeness
of an address. For example, addresses belonging to Bitcoin
exchanges usually have a higher trade frequency for a great
many of businesses, while the trade frequency and the account
balance of many ordinary users are relatively much lower. The
extracted account features for each address, referred to as AFs,
are detailed as follows:
AF1: Balance of the address2.
AF2: Number of input transactions in the snapshot.
AF3: Number of output transactions in the snapshot.
AF4: Total amount of input transactions in the snapshot.
AF5: Total amount of output transactions in the snapshot.
AF6: Amount ratio of total input transactions to total output
transactions.
Table IV summarizes the mean, standard deviation (StdDev)
and median values of the account features for all the labeled
addresses and unlabeled addresses in our datasets. Some
notable results can be obtained from Table IV as follows:
• Finding 4. There exists a large variety among the unla-
beled addresses in terms of account features because there
exist multiple types of unlabeled addresses. However, the
difference of account features between labeled addresses
2The balance information is crawled from the api of blockchain.info on
June 17th, 2019.
TABLE IV
STATISTICS OF ACCOUNT FEATURES.
AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 AF6
Labeled address
Mean 1.80e-05 1.28 1.28 1.48 1.48 1.00
StdDev 2.01e-03 2.56 2.54 7.22 7.21 0.45
Median 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.32 0.32 1.00
Unlabeled address
Mean 0.02 1.79 1.87 6.79 6.80 57.50
StdDev 18.64 42.93 43.07 1228.91 1227.68 68766.30
Median 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.11 0.11 1.00
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is relatively smaller, as illustrated by a relatively low
value of standard deviation.
• Finding 5. The average balance value of most labeled
addresses is close to 0. For unlabeled addresses, the mean
value and standard deviation of the account balance is
much larger.
• Finding 6. According to the results in terms of AF6,
the amount value of output transactions usually equals
to that of input transactions for labeled addresses, while
the unlabeled addresses keep a positive net income on
average.
These observations can fully illustrate that addresses be-
longing to mixing services act like intermediaries by sending
out what they have received in short time.
C. Transaction Features
Next, transaction behaviors of addresses in the mixing
process are measured by transaction features. Since the re-
lationship between senders and recipients of a mixing process
would be obviously detected if the mixing service directly
send out an approximate equal amount (minus the charges
for mixing service, and in this paper we do not consider
them) to its recipients in the following blocks, mixing services
may use many addresses acting like “intermediary” addresses
(e.g. hubs) to participate in the process of fund splitting and
integrating [5]. After spread by a large number of intermediary
addresses over a period of time, Bitcoins from the transaction
sources are finally sent to the corresponding recipients.
Here we introduce the concept of transaction cycle, con-
sisting of an ordered pair of continuous input and output
streams, to describe the process of money flowing through an
intermediary address for Bitcoins enrolled in mixing services.
Fig. 7 displays ten continuous transactions of an address
belonging to Bitcoin Fog. The x-axis in this figure represents
the time line, while the y-axis represents how much the address
received and sent. These ten transactions are distributed in
three transaction cycles, and during each cycle, the address
finally sent out what it had received with an increased balance
value 0. We observe that many labeled addresses have similar
transaction behavior like this, and suppose that this behavior
is associated with the nature of being an intermediary. Two
transaction features (referred as TFs) are extracted as follows:
TF1: Standard deviation of the increased balance in every
transaction cycle (the expected value of increased balance for
an intermediary address is 0).
TF2: Average time interval T¯ between the first input trans-
action and the last output transaction in each cycle.
The cumulative proportion line chart of T¯ is shown in Fig.
8. We can observe that the avereage time interval of transaction
cycles of mixing services is mostly within 3 hours, while the
transaction cycle duration of an unlabeled address does not
have such an obvious pattern. One possible explanation of this
phenomenon is that mixing services are designed to process
Bitcoins within a relatively short time as they are user-oriented
services. For example, Helix3 has a maximum process time of
3https://helixlightgrams.com/
Fig. 7. A transaction cycle is composed of a continuous input stream
and a continuous output stream. Three transaction cycles of labeled address
“1NsNkSxyYjB9o3QkPT2RjTXST4nGRtfMzS” are shown in this figure.
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Fig. 8. The cumulative proportion of average time T¯ .
2 hours to launder Bitcoins. As a result, we preliminarily set
δ = 3 hours as the time window of motifs when conducting
descriptive statistics and mixing detection.
V. DETECTION MODEL
In the mixing detection task considered here, we only access
a small number of verified labeled addresses belonging to
mixing services while the rest addresses are unlabeled. This
problem of extreme class imbalance may greatly hinder the
performance of supervised classification. To deal with this
problem, we develop a Positive and Unlabeled (PU) learning
model with a two-stage strategy.
In stage one, according to the spy technique proposed in
[8], we sample a set of spy instances from positive instances
with a default sample rate 15%. The rest of the positive
instances are set with label 1, while the spy instances as well as
the unlabeled instances are set with label -1, and then they are
used to train the classifier. Here we employ logistic regression
as the classifier to ensure efficiency.
Since the spy instances are actually positive instances, the
probability of a spy being predicted as a positive instance
would be usually higher than that of a negative instance.
Therefore, we can select a threshold θ based on the predic-
tion probabilities of the spy instances. The reliable negative
instances are selected out according to θ and the prediction
probabilities of the unlabeled instances.
We select the probability threshold θ as the value which
can maximize the difference of the growth rates between
the cumulative proportion of unlabeled instances and spy
instances. For each instance i in the instance set, its probability
of being predicted as a positive instance is denoted xi and
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TABLE V
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT METHODS (WITH STANDARD DEVIATION).
Dataset Metric OCSVM IF LR DT IS11 IS22 Our method
2014
TPR 0.9205±0.0004 0.9326±0.0021 0.1720±0.0018 0.7150±0.0058 0.8208±0.0 0.8208 ±0.0 0.9189±0.0004
FPR 0.1809±0.0005 0.2082±0.0283 0.0±0.0∗ 0.0±0.0∗ 0.0406±0.0002 0.0364±0.0001 0.0302±0.0004
G-Mean 0.8683±0.0003 0.8592±0.0149 0.4147±0.0021 0.8456±0.0034 0.8874±0.0 0.8894±0.0 0.9440±0.0003
2015
TPR 0.9026±0.0009 0.9054±0.0034 0.0609±0.0014 0.5979±0.0059 0.7871±0.0 0.7871±0.0 0.9147±0.0007
FPR 0.1672±0.0006 0.2092±0.0259 0.0±0.0∗ 0.0±0.0∗ 0.0440±0.0002 0.0449±0.0002 0.0337±0.0005
G-Mean 0.8670±0.0005 0.8460±0.0136 0.2468±0.0028 0.7732±0.0038 0.8674±0.0001 0.8670±0.0 0.9401±0.0005
2016
TPR 0.9157±0.0003 0.9204±0.0027 0.0025±0.0 0.3938±0.0023 0.9409±0.0 0.9409±0.0 0.9343±0.0004
FPR 0.2265±0.0006 0.3804±0.0301 0.0±0.0∗ 0.0±0.0∗ 0.0609±0.0003 0.0604±0.0003 0.0362±0.0003
G-Mean 0.8416±0.0004 0.7550±0.0181 0.0503±0.0 0.6275±0.0018 0.9400±0.0002 0.9403±0.0002 0.9490±0.0002
1,2 IS1 and IS2 use two different inter links counting function, namely relative inter links and total inter links respectively [7].
* The marked FPRs imply that there exists overfitting problems in LR and DT as the positive instances are more likely to be predicted as negative instances.
stored in a set X , namely xi ∈ X , and then the cumulative
distribution function F (·) of X is given by
FX(p) = P (X 6 p), (2)
where P (X 6 p) represents the probability that values in X
less than or equal to a value p. Then the growth rate of FX(p)
with ∆p as the minute change of probability p (∆p = 0.005
in our model) is denoted as:
∆FX(p) = FX(p)− FX(p−∆p). (3)
According to the prediction probabilities of spy instances
and unlabeled instances stored in S and U respectively, the
threshold θ is calculated as:
θ = arg maxp∈[0+∆p,1](∆FU (p)−∆FS(p)). (4)
In stage two, with the consideration that the number of
positive instances and that of reliable negative instances may
be imbalanced, we set different penalty weights for different
kinds of instances in the loss function. The following objective
function should be minimized.
C+
∑
yi=1
l(yi, f(xi)) + C−
∑
yi=−1
l(yi, f(xi)) + λR(w), (5)
where C+ and C− denote the penalty coefficients of positive
and reliable negative instances, respectively, l(yi, f(xi)) is
the loss term, R(w) is the regularization term and λ is the
regularization coefficient. In this work, we apply a biased
logistic regression (biased LR) classifier so that the loss term
is set to be log loss and the regularization term is set to be
L2-norm. Besides, C+ and C− are inversely proportional to
the number of positive and reliable negative instances in our
settings.
Finally, we choose a probability threshold ε and make
a decision according to the prediction probability of each
unlabeled address. An unlabeled address is detected as an
address associated with mixing services when its probability
of being predicted as a positive instance is greater than ε.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation on
the proposed detection framework for Bitcoin mixing services.
First, we describe our experiment settings. Then, we present
TABLE VI
DETECTION RESULTS.
Dataset Unlabeled address Detected address (ratio)
2014 594853 39828 (6.7%)
2015 588921 37639 (6.4%)
2016 556679 47546 (8.5%)
the experimental results of the proposed method in comparison
with several baseline methods. Next, the effects of motif-
based features and other basic features are compared and
summarized. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our
framework via a parameter sensitivity analysis.
A. Experiment Settings
In all the experiments, we set the time window δ = 3 hours
and the probability threshold ε = 0.6. All the reported results
are averaged over 10 independent experiments.
Datasets. As mentioned in Section II, we obtain three
datasets with transaction data from a Bitcoin client as well as
labels from WalletExplorer, and then conduct experiments on
these three datasets. After the process of address filtering, we
divide each dataset into training set and testing set as follows:
(1) Training set: For stage one, we select 70% unlabeled ad-
dresses and 70% labeled addresses to form the training set,
and then we can obtain some reliable negative instances.
For stage two, the training set is made up of 70% reliable
negative instances as well as the labeled addresses used
in stage one.
(2) Testing set: The testing set is formed by the remaining
30% reliable negative instances and 30% labeled addresses
to evaluate our model.
Methods for Comparison. Our model is based on PU
learning with a two-stage strategy, which is actually a semi-
supervised learning method. To evaluate the effectiveness of
PU learning in our scenario, we compare our model with
a number of baseline methods including one-class support
vector machine (OCSVM), isolation forest (IF) [12], logistic
regression (LR), decision tree (DT) and InterScore (IS) [7].
Among them, OCSVM and IF are two unsupervised anomaly
detection method, LR and DT are two widely used supervised
classifiers. IS is a Bitcoin mixing detection method which can
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TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT FEATURES (WITH STANDARD DEVIATION).
Dataset Metric Basic features Temporal motifs ATH motifs Hybrid motifs∗ Basic features & Basic features & Basic features &
Temporal motifs ATH motifs Hybrid motifs∗
2014
TPR 0.8917±0.0032 0.8740±0.0 0.8279±0.0003 0.9037±0.0003 0.8946±0.0008 0.8837±0.0056 0.9189±0.0004
FPR 0.1665±0.0050 0.0445±0.0004 0.0782±0.0004 0.0348±0.0001 0.0285±0.0005 0.0717±0.0011 0.0302±0.0004
G-Mean 0.8621±0.0040 0.9138±0.0002 0.8736±0.0001 0.9339±0.0001 0.9323±0.0004 0.9057±0.0032 0.9440±0.0003
2015
TPR 0.8091±0.0012 0.8399±0.0 0.8586±0.0 0.8916±0.0004 0.8677±0.0013 0.8531±0.0012 0.9147±0.0007
FPR 0.1420±0.0018 0.1400±0.0006 0.0796±0.0005 0.0652±0.0004 0.0830±0.0031 0.0761±0.0005 0.0337±0.0005
G-Mean 0.8332±0.0011 0.8499±0.0003 0.8889±0.0002 0.9129±0.0002 0.8920±0.0011 0.8878±0.0008 0.9401±0.0005
2016
TPR 0.5253±0.0406 0.9300±0.0 0.6736±0.0004 0.9079±0.0005 0.9318±0.0004 0.7985±0.0017 0.9343±0.0004
FPR 0.3658±0.0026 0.0599±0.0003 0.2582±0.0006 0.0398±0.0004 0.0514±0.0003 0.1815±0.0039 0.0362±0.0003
G-Mean 0.5768±0.0212 0.9350±0.0001 0.7069±0.0004 0.9337±0.0002 0.9402±0.0002 0.8084±0.0026 0.9490±0.0002
* Hybrid motifs are a combination of Temporal and ATH motifs.
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Fig. 9. Patameter analysis of time window δ. (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the results of TPR, FPR and G-Mean measured against different δ respectively.
detect mixing service entities containing multiple addresses
with community anomaly detection, as addresses belonging to
these entities usually have more inter-community connections
than other addresses. Since here we focus on the problem
of detecting addresses of mixing services, we consider the
label of an address is equal to the label of its entity when
implementing IS.
Evaluation metrics. In this work, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of our model in terms of true positive rate (TPR), false
positive rate (FPR) and the Geometric Mean (G-Mean). G-
Mean was suggested in [13] and has been widely used as
a comprehensive metric in evaluating classification perfor-
mances on imbalanced datasets [14] [15]. Taking both the
accuracy of positive instances and negative instances into
account, G-Mean is defined as follows:
G−Mean =
√
TPR× (1− FPR) (6)
B. Detection Results
Table V compares the performance of our method with the
baseline methods. Specifically, the proportion of outliers in
the datasets is set to be 8% when fitting OCSVM and IF.
According to Table V, we have the following observations:
(1) The unsupervised anomaly detection methods (i.e.,
OCSVM, IF and IS) can discover most of the positive
instances, however, they have a higher false positive rate
than other methods. In particular, since IS only captures
one important topology feature of being an intermediary
in user transactions, it is in lack of generalization so that
its performance is significantly differentiated in different
datasets.
(2) The two supervised methods including LR and DT lead to
the problem of overfitting and relatively poor performance.
There exists two possible reasons for this result, one
reason is that the extreme class imbalance hinders the
performance of supervised classification, and the other
reason is that these two methods treat all unlabeled ad-
dresses as negative instances, which may induce noises to
the datasets.
(3) By selecting reliable negative instances from unlabeled
instances first and then apply a supervised method, the
proposed strategy can improve the detection rate of posi-
tive instances compared with directly applying supervised
approaches, and obtain the best results in terms of G-
Mean.
These observations show that the PU learning framework
performs better on Bitcoin mixing detection with a high true
positive rate exceeding 91% and a low false positive rate below
4% on extremely imbalanced datasets. We then apply our
model on unlabeled addresses that not appear in training sets,
and the number of detected addresses is given in Table VI.
As we can see, about 6%-9% of the unlabeled addresses are
detected as suspicious addresses belonging to mixing services
in these three snapshots, which facilitates further investigation
of illegal transactions on relative users.
C. Validity Proof of Hybrid Motifs
In Section IV, we propose a series of features from the per-
spective of network, account and transaction levels. According
to the results given in Tables II and III, and the analysis in
Section IV, we can see that motifs should be critical features
for mixing detection. Therefore, we divide all the features
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TABLE VIII
PATAMETER ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY THRESHOLD ε.
Dataset Metric 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2014
TPR 0.9346 0.9189 0.8970 0.8731 0.8071
FPR 0.0433 0.0302 0.0201 0.0118 0.0050
2015
TPR 0.9313 0.9147 0.8957 0.8638 0.8004
FPR 0.0550 0.0337 0.0189 0.0103 0.0050
2016
TPR 0.9441 0.9343 0.9207 0.8987 0.8489
FPR 0.0511 0.0362 0.0232 0.0114 0.0034
given in Section IV into basic features (features except motifs)
and motifs (including temporal and ATH motifs) to train the
classifier and further evaluate the importance of motifs in the
detection. A detailed comparison is given in Table VII and can
be summarized as follows:
(1) The detection performance is relatively poor when we
only use the basic features. While network motifs, which
can reveal the higher-order features in complex network,
achieve decent performance in mixing detection.
(2) Each evaluation metric can be significantly improved for
almost all cases when combining hybrid motifs with basic
features.
In summary, the experimental results demonstrate that hy-
brid motifs including temporal motif and ATH motifs play an
indispensable role in the task of Bitcoin mixing detection.
D. Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
Next, we provide a sensitivity analysis for the time window
parameter δ and the probability threshold ε to understand their
impacts on the performance of the proposed model.
Fig. 9 shows the results in terms of TPR, FPR and G-Mean
of our model versus time window δ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, ..., 6}
hours. We can observe that the curves of the metrics are gener-
ally stable, which illustrates that our model can steadily obtain
relative good results under different settings of parameter δ in
the testing domain.
We also provide TPR and FPR results of our model under
different probability threshold ε for voting in Table VIII. We
can observe that TPR and FPR degrade as ε increases. The
lower ε is, the higher TPR is. While for FPR, it becomes higher
with a larger ε. For practical applications, we can choose an
appropriate threshold according to our specific requirement of
pursuing a higher TPR or ensuring a lower FPR.
VII. RELATED WORK
As a new technology, blockchain has attracted intensive in-
terests of researchers from various fields. Since the transaction
data of blockchain systems are usually publicly accessible,
they have been extensively studied and mined to discover
some specific activities such as scams [16], gambling [17],
dark market trading [18] and so on. Chen et al. conducted a
graph analysis and abnormal contract detection on Ethereum
with money flow graph, smart contract creation graph and
smart contract invocation graph [19]. Tam et al. proposed a
Graph Convolution Network (GCN)-based embedding method
to identify illicit accounts within the e-payment networks in-
cluding the Ethereum transaction network [20]. In [21], typical
abnormal transaction patterns for Bitcoin market manipulation
were mined by inspecting the base networks with singular
value decomposition metrics.
For the issue of money laundering detection in Bitcoin,
Mo¨ser et al. provided an inquiry into the operation mode
of three mixing services and try to trace the anonymous
transactions [5]. Weber et al. emphasize the importance of
Anti-money laundering (AML) regulations in financial system,
and contributed the Elliptic dataset for illicit activity detection
in Bitcoin [22]. Ranshous et al. introduced the idea of motifs in
directed hypergraphs and recognized some specific laundering
patterns for Bitcoin exchanges [23]. Bitconeview, a visual-
ization tool for Bitcoin, was proposed to visualize how and
when an address mixes its money [24]. Yet these techniques
do not focus on identifying addresses enrolling in mixing.
Another work shed light on the problem of Bitcoin mixing
detection and tackled it as a community outlier detection
problem [7]. However, this work is in lack of generalization
for different mixing services and it only utilizes the topology
information of transaction network. Inspired by a related study
about detecting Ponzi schemes on Ethereum [25], in this paper,
we propose features from multi-level, trying to discover the
transaction patterns of mixing services for enhancement of the
generalization ability.
It is worth mentioning that the network motifs we used,
which are defined as the recurrent subgraph patterns of com-
plex networks [9], play an important role in characterizing the
behavior of mixing services. As the simple building blocks
in complex systems, motifs have been demonstrated as a
powerful tool for revealing higher-order organizations [26]
and functional properties. Since many interactions between
objects are intermittent rather than persistent [27], network
motifs combined with temporal information were proposed
to characterize dynamic homogeneous network [10], and also
had an extensive version in heterogeneous information net-
work [28]. Recently, there are many studies utilized network
motifs in blockchain transaction network mining tasks, such as
price prediction [29], [30], network property analysis [31], ex-
change pattern mining [23] and so on. Network attributes play
important roles in network mining tasks [11], nevertheless, few
work have been conducted to considering in the construction
of specific attributes.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we studied the Bitcoin mixing detection
problem and conducted a systematic analysis to characterize
how addresses belonging to mixing services behave in the
Bitcoin transaction network. To mine the dynamic process
and transaction patterns in Bitcoin more comprehensively, we
employed the Bitcoin transaction records to build two temporal
directed graphs including a homogeneous Address-Address
Interaction Network (AAIN) and a heterogeneous Transaction-
Address Interaction Network (TAIN). For TAIN, we proposed
a novel concept of ATH motifs to integrate edge attribute
information with higher-order structures. We developed hybrid
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motifs, including temporal motifs in AAIN and ATH motifs in
TAIN, as the key features for mixing detection. With several
designed features, we built a PU learning based detection
model to handle the issue of extremely label imbalance of
the mixing detection problem. Extensive experimental results
on three real Bitcoin datasets demonstrated the effectiveness
of our detection model.
This work revealed some critical transaction behaviors
which can distinguish the addresses belonging to mixing
services, and then designed an effective method to detect
these addresses. One concern is that, the mixing service
providers may update their mechanisms to eliminate these
typical behaviors and avoid being detected. For example, they
can inject extra Bitcoins from external addresses and those
injected “dirty” Bitcoins may sit in their addresses for a
long time to fake the flow of Bitcoins, or they may increase
and randomize the interval between the arrival and departure
of Bitcoins, to avoid creating the discussed motifs within
specific time window. Since the available data is intrinsically
mostly unlabeled and our detection model is based on the
prior information, these unknown complex mixing strategies
may exist and may not be detected. For future work, we will
conduct a more thorough study by considering more complex
mixing strategies.
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